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Abstract
This thesis measures the impact of the new "big box" retailers (Sam's
Club, BJ's, Price Club, Costco, Home Depot, etc.) on the more traditional
methods of retailing such as super regional and regional malls and
community and neighborhood centers in the Massachusetts market
area. An initial survey counts the number of these stores built,
under development, and currently planned.
The big box retailers are divided into two classes, warehouse
clubs and category killers. The home improvement industry is
examined to determine the impact of the category killers.
This paper examines the operational strategies of these new
retailers and attempts to identify those traditional retailers most at
risk. Having determined those retailers most at risk, the paper
attempts to then determine those property types most affected by
the big boxes.
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INTRODUCTION
The business of retailing is like a tree - it is a
living growing entity. Every year, it keeps
coming back. Hard weather, competition from
other trees for water and sunlight, and selective
pruning cause the tree to shed some weak or
dying limbs, but it will just as surely grow some
newer, stronger ones to replace them.1
The 1980's was a decade of tremendous structural change in
the $1.5 trillion per year retailing industry .2 Heavily impacted by
the mergers and acquisitions mania, the retail industry was also
affected by the utilization of new technologies enabling faster and
more precise handling of information and merchandise, and by the
changing demographic patterns across the country. The result of
this turmoil is a retail landscape today that is vastly different from
the one which prevailed in the 1980's.
A change most often cited in the business press as having a
significant long term impact on the industry is the advent of the "big
box," or warehouse format, retailer. The "big box" retailer as defined
in this thesis has the following characteristics: First, it is large; "big
box" stores have at least 80,000 square feet of selling space, with an
1McCarthy, John CBL, Inc., Boston, MA, June 23, 1992.
2 1991 Total U.S. retail sales, minus autos. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. Research,
Spring, 1992.
average size close to 105,000 square feet. Second, it stresses
volume; average sales per square foot (SF) are the highest in
retailing, with some stores exceeding $1,000/SF per year. Third,
these retailers work on very low margins, turning product quickly,
utilizing efficient inventory controls and squeezing overhead via
low-cost buildings and smaller employee to sales ratios than
traditional retailers. By focusing on popular, high volume items and
low margins, the "big boxes" offer consumers unprecedented
opportunities to save money.
There are two distinct types of big boxes as defined by their
merchandise strategies. The first is the warehouse/membership
club, which charges a fee for shopping rights and carries a very
broad variety of bulk merchandise in a no-frills environment. The
second type, which does not charge a fee or require membership, is
known as the "category killer." Category killers specialize in one
category of merchandise and carry a tremendous depth of products
in their chosen field. The home improvement industry is examined
in depth to ascertain the impact of the category killers.
This thesis also examines the impact that these "big boxes" will
have on the Massachusetts retail real estate market, with emphasis
given to the super regional, regional, community, and neighborhood
centers. Chapter I explores the demographic outlook for retailing in
the nation and Massachusetts in particular over the next three
years. Chapter II provides an historical overview of the "big box"
stores and the fundamental dynamics under which they operate, as
well as discussion of the market forces which have allowed theses
formats to proliferate. Chapter III looks at those industries most
affected by the warehouse club industry. Chapter IV explores the
impact of the warehouse format on the home improvement industry.
Chapter V focuses on what effects the boxes will have on the major
classes of retail property.
This analysis relies heavily on interviews with retailers of all
kinds, and with the consultants, owners, and developers involved
with retail real estate. Much of the data was taken from a study
entitled "Warehouse/Membership Clubs in North America: Are They
Retailers or Wholesalers? And Who is at Risk?" 3
I. The Retail Outlook: Demographics and Economics
What are the trends among consumers and the population in general
that will affect the eventual impact these "big boxes" will have in
Massachusetts? An overview of national trends and as well as a
look at the more local aspects of the demographics will provide
added insight. These trends evolve as populations shift and tastes
change; the best retailers, in any segment, must be swift and sure in
their managerial decisions to ensure that they keep pace in the
business whose motto is "grow or die."
A general concern in all segments of real estate today is that of
the problem of oversupply. Excess capacity can cause a lack of
pricing power from the retailers perspective, enabling shoppers to
"cherry pick" sales specials and keep profits down. This excess
supply of course also keeps the profits down for the owner/
3 Tigert, Douglas J., Arnold, Stephen and Cotter, Terry, Babson College Retailing
Research Report No. 6, April, 1992.
developer of the space. The consequence is that values shrink or
don't keep pace with the values of other investments on a risk-
adjusted basis. There is a consensus among retailers and retail
developers that there are many areas of the country suffering from
an oversupply of retail space.
The typical scenario leading to excess building was not only
easily available credit but available land with few restrictions and a
population growing in either size or purchasing power. Not
surprisingly, California, Florida, and parts of Texas, all suffer today
from an oversupply of retail space, among other things. Retail
executives I interviewed believe that Boston is under-retailed. They
offered as evidence the fact that many developers and retailers are
still trying to enter this market with a frenzy.
Another measure of supply comes from the International
Council of Shopping Centers' Scope of the Shopping Center Industry
in the United States 1992-1993. In it, the ICSC lists the total per
capita SF of Gross Leasable Area (GLA) in shopping centers
nationally and by state. The national average for 1991 was 18.1 SF
per capita, while Massachusetts averages 16.4 SF, approximately
10% less than the national average. Florida comes in significantly
higher at 27.2 SF per capita, while Virginia averages 22.3 SF.
Differences in population massing and purchasing power can account
for small differences, but one assumes that Massachusetts' well
educated, rather densely packed profile should have kept its
demand side high through the late 1980's. However, the cumulative
increase in per capita GLA in Massachusetts for the years 1988-91
was only 8.7% total.
One of the most important methods of economic growth in the
retail sector will be increased productivity, that is an increase in
productivity by square footage, by labor, and by inventory dollars.
A step in that direction has already been made by the retailers, who
have cut their overall on-site employment at Massachusetts retail
centers by almost 2% from 1990 to 1991 alone, while adding 1.5
million SF of GLA. Sales increased by $700 million, or 1% over the
same period. 4
Paine Webber's forecast for real disposable income growth for
the nation in the 1990's is 1.8%, well below that of the 2% rate of the
1980's. Their forecast for real retail sales growth is 2 1/2%,
adjusted for inflation. When comparing these rates of growth with
increased GLA on a nationwide basis, the numbers are not
4 International Council of Shopping Centers, The Scope of the Shopping Center
Industry in the United States 1992-1993, ICSC, New York, NY, 1992, p.2 5 .
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heartening. Disposable personal income (DPI) per GLA square
footage has decreased annually since 1986, from a high of $926 to a
current low of $771 (estimated) in 1991. Retail sales per GLA have
shown a similar trend nationally, down from a high in '86 of $391 to
$319 ('91 estimated). Significantly, both of these ratios are also
below the last major recession years of 1980-1982.
The search by consumers for value has become the most
powerful trend affecting retailing in the early 1990's. It cuts across
all segments of buyers; from the richest to the poorest, everyone is
looking for a closer value/price relationship when they shop. Every
retailer interviewed for this thesis acknowledged that they have and
will continue to cut their operating margins to give consumers
merchandise at the right price. In the past, this occasional trend has
impacted only the lower end of retailers, the discounters and off-
price industry. The backlash from the free spending 1980's has
fostered an environment in which all costs are minutely scrutinized,
no matter how large or small, or whether a necessity or a luxury.
Five Essential Elements of a Successful Shopping Center
In its various forms, the shopping center has come to symbolize the
suburbanization of American life. Centers have proliferated around
the great circumferential highways built in the 1960's and '70's, and
although they take a number of different shapes and sizes (Exhibit
I), the successful ones that continue to attract the top tenants and
draw consumers have much in common.
A shopping center needs five essential elements to be a viable
economic entity:
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1.) A center must have the right market factors. There must be
ample demand created by the demographics within the center's
market area to support the quantity and quality of tenants in the
center. A thorough and accurate understanding of the market
factors is essential
2.) A center must have unique restraints of trade or barriers to
entry to keep competition from overwhelming the supply side.
These can take the form of a lack of properly zoned or sized land or
an environment in which permitting is uncertain and costly. The
overwhelming majority of major new retail sites over the past thirty
years have resulted from new highway construction; new highway
construction in Massachusetts is nearly nonexistent, and
environmental and zoning constraints are among the toughest in the
nation.
3.) The center must have the right anchor store, or mix of stores in
the case of smaller centers. The center must respond to the needs of
its constituency; in the Boston market, a regional center needs a
leading local department store like Filene's or Jordan's as an anchor.
A neighborhood center needs one of the strong local groceries, like
Shaw's or Stop & Shop, as an anchor. The relatively small number of
department store anchors remaining may be a blessing to the super
regional and regional malls; the fewer anchor players are less likely
to compete with themselves by driving excess development
4.) The center must be financed properly. It must have a
manageable debt structure allowing it to compete for tenants at
reasonable rent levels. The 100% financing of the 1980's is
thankfully gone, and those centers that do not have adequate
financing structures will soon be owned by better capitalized
entities
5.) The center must have good management. The property must be
managed as a living, constantly changing entity to best respond to
changing consumer desires, not just as bricks and mortar.
Any type of center possessing all of these characteristics will
prosper; those that do not posses them will have a more difficult
time competing. Frequently the elements intertwine. Changing
demographics do not make a center obsolete; they provide an
opportunity for management to change the tenant mix to a more
profitable one. To accomplish this, management must have access to
capital to update common areas and enhance the sense of shopping
as more than just a chore.
Through the roaring 1980's of Massachusetts' Miracle folklore,
the shopping center development industry tried to keep pace with
the burgeoning economy. However, strict permitting,
environmental, and zoning considerations exacerbated the problem
of finding large, well-located sites. The result, according to retail
executives, is an environment in Massachusetts in which landlords
hold the upper hand. They can pick and choose their tenants, charge
higher rents than the rest of the country, on average, and
sometimes get away without spending the money to update their
properties as they would in a more competitive market.
Trends
Predictions for new trends affecting consumer buying patterns
in the 1990's center around the continued aging of the baby boomer
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segment. According to a Paine Webbers, as the baby boomers enter
peak earning years and see their families grow, a "nesting" tendency
will dominate, manifesting itself in these five trends: 1) home
reinvestment, 2) branded loyalty, 3) spending on children, 4)
entrepreneurship, and 5) store loyalty. All of these trends will be
impacted by the quest for value. To be successful in the '90's,
retailers will have to capitalize on these trends, which will be
reviewed next.
Home reinvestment: Reinvestment in the home will be a major
trend in the 1990's. Baby boomers, entering their top earning years
as their young families grow, will respond by upgrading their
housing. This will be done either by buying a newer, larger home or
by upgrading the existing through additions and renovations. The
home-centered, leisure/family nature of the 1990's will spur
consumers to invest in home furnishings and the yard.
Branded loyalty: Family households consume endless amounts
of goods like toothpaste, toilet paper, and cleaning solutions. The
proliferation of products in the health and beauty aid field has
added to consumption, as different brands are preferred by
different members within a household. The consumer's goal in
filling this list is simple: find the right brand at the best price. With
little or no inflation in this market, the successful retailers goal must
be one of market share.
Spending on children: There are two factors at work here. One
is the absolute increase in the number of children: the largest
5 McGlade, Margo, "Retailing 1992-1997: Change, upheaval, turmoil &
investment opportunity" Paine Webber Incorporated, February 3, 1992
percentage growth segment in the population is in the 10-14 year
age group, which will increase by 1,739% over the next five years. 6
The second is a greater willingness on behalf of parents to spend
money on these children. The growth in products serving this sector
has been incredible, evinced by the proliferation of items like
branded apparel, athletic shoes, and movies for the VCR, all for
children.
En trepreneurship: Small business is often overlooked as a
prime element of economic strength. The 1990's will continue to see
entrepreneurial growth driven by a combination of necessity and
choice. Many white collar workers will be faced with the
elimination of whole job descriptions as larger businesses react to
change. Lack of job satisfaction and lifestyle decisions will lead to
decisions to run small businesses. Baby boomers with 12-25 years
of work experience and the ability to raise capital will leave larger
corporations. This group in itself will not be a huge factor, but they
will be employers to a much larger group of people.
Store loyalty: Fewer people say they enjoy shopping than have
in the past. This reflects more on the attitude of changing priorities
and values than it does on the shopping environment today. As
consumers age and family responsibilities take up more time,
shopping as an activity unto itself will decline. Instead, this
customer will be looking for consistency in service, quality, taste,
and lifestyle, but novelty in rapid product turnover, new product
introductions, and inspired marketing.
6 McGlade, Paine Webber p.7.
Countertrend
While the aging baby boomers and their families become a
prime target market for retailers, another growing segment of the
market must be serviced. There will be a sizable market of
consumers who are under severe financial constraints as the gap
between the more affluent and lower end consumer widens. Real
incomes for people with high school diplomas or less have been
falling for the past fifteen years, while real income for those with
college degrees has held steady and those with advanced degrees
have seen increases. The trend of a shrinking blue collar workforce
and the decline of labor unions in strength and numbers are
expected to continue through the 1990's. These consumers will be
served by retailers offering excellent value on necessities such as
food and clothes. The widening gap between the top and bottom of
the income distributions will foster a more two-tiered retail
environment in the future.
The Economic Outlook: New England
The New England Economic Project forecast for New England, and
Massachusetts in particular, predicts a long, slow improvement in
the economy. 1992 is seen as a stabilizing year, with a modest
pickup after '92 through 1995. While confidence levels remain
relatively low, they are rebounding faster in New England than in
the rest of the country.
Existing home sales in Massachusetts as measured in dollar
volume are trending higher now than at any time over the past two
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years. While still well below the abnormally high peak years of
1986-87, they approximate the levels of 1983-84 when
Massachusetts was emerging from the last national recession.
Seasonally adjusted housing permits are also very low, in the range
of 1,000 per year as in 1982, but trending slightly upward.
Payroll employment in Massachusetts, as measured by the
number of jobs, is leveling off at approximately 2.8 million. This is
down from about 3.2 million jobs at the highest point of 1988-89.
The unemployment rate in Massachusetts stopped rising in 1990
and has shown a slight decrease since then to today's level of just
over 8%. The rate of inflation is down to just over two percent.
Economists predict job stabilization in Massachusetts despite
the impact of sizeable further cutbacks in defense spending and
mature computer companies in the region. The fiscal condition of
the State is improving to the point that the credit rating may be
upgraded. Having lost approximately 15% of its job base, given the
rate of growth predicted for Massachusetts for the period 1992-95,
it will take 5-7 years to recapture those jobs lost from 1988-91.
Inflation is pegged at 3.2% for the remainder of 1992, bumping up
to 3.6-3.8% for '93. Consumer spending, as predicted by Shawmut
National Bank, will increase 2.7% for 1992 and then 2.9% in '93.
Percentage change in personal income for Massachusetts is predicted
to be up 3.6% in 1992 and then rise from '93-95 at 6.3%, 7%, and
5.9%, respectively.
It is clear from the data that Massachusetts' consumer
purchasing power will remain mired in slow growth through 1995.
The size of the retailer's pie will not increase, and the battle will be
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fought for roughly the same dollars that exist today. Those retailers
who operate well in this environment will survive, and some will
prosper. Those that do not operate well will have an extremely
difficult time surviving.
The implications of these projections are that the
Massachusetts retail environment will remain static through at least
1995. All retailers will be competing for a fixed amount of dollars in
a "zero sum" game. Some segments will experience strong net
growth as other segments decline in a natural selection process of
fads, trends, and new products. As there will be no rising tide to lift
all boats, those retail firms and formats not in shipshape will be left
to founder.
' The warehouse clubs and the category killers, while distinct
from one another, both seem well-designed to take advantage of the
consumer's emphasis on value as a key component of purchasing
decisions. Their low overhead, low margin operations promise
consumers alternatives to the traditional stores and centers.
Chapter II takes a closer look at the clubs' methods of operations
and exposes those Massachusetts' retailers who stand to lose the
most from the influx of the warehouse clubs and category killers.
II. The Warehouse Clubs
Warehouse or wholesale clubs are the prime example of big boxes
drawing a great deal of attention in the press today. They are
reportedly inundating the metro Boston area with their stores,
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ready, willing, and able to usurp the economic viability of every
existing retail format from small, mom-and-pop dominated
neighborhood centers to the super regional malls with their huge
national tenants. When judged by the typical parameters of retail
companies such as sales per square foot and average dollar amount
spent per customer, these warehouse clubs can give the impression
that they have made a quantum leap from the mass merchandisers
of the 1980's. This section describes the concepts of the warehouse
clubs and how they relate to the traditional methods of retailing
The Hunter: Physical and Operational Characteristics of the
Warehouse
Warehouse or wholesale clubs are best characterized by their
physical appearances. They operate in a pared down physical plant,
with forklifts freely roaming the concrete floor to restock the 16-24'
high industrial shelves with cases of goods. The buildings
themselves are secure block construction with steel spanning and
flat rubber roofs. There is no architecture involved at all in the
building, only engineering. As the shark is the perfectly engineered
eating machine of the ocean, the warehouses club plant is the
perfectly designed selling machine of the land. They are surrounded
by a sea of parking, with a target ratio of 5 spaces per 1,000 square
feet of selling space. For the average club building of 115,000 SF
this equates to 575 parking spaces, requiring a total land parcel of
approximately 8-12 acres, depending upon local zoning ordinances.
These retailers operate in a club format, requiring membership in
the form of annual dues, typically $25.00 per household or small
18
business. Applicants are screened for credit and income history, but
the clubs do not issue credit of any kind. Restricted membership
reduces the risk of bad checks and in-store shrinkage due to
shoplifting, and provides financial stability to the club.
Wholesale clubs utilize a high volume, low overhead strategy.
Their typical markup on products sold is between 8-10%. By
contrast, typical discount retailers like Bradlee's and Caldor average
markups in the 26-28% range. One of the unique operational
aspects of the club industry is its distribution system. The clubs cut
distribution costs by cutting out anything that adds expense
between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer. Rather than
buying from distributors who have already bought and handled the
merchandise, the clubs buy directly from manufacturers. And they
do not break down the products once they are delivered to the "big
box"-it is sold in the same large size case wrapping it comes to the
store in. The consumer can only purchase items that are stored in
the selling space by the caseload; there is no back room for excess
inventory at club stores. This distribution edge that the clubs have
over other more traditional retailers is magnified by the fact that
the clubs are, at 16 years young, still in their embryonic stages and
more easily able to incorporate the latest technologies and
techniques for streamlined operations. In his latest compilation,
entitled Managing for the Future- The 1990's and Beyond, Peter
Drucker discusses the great changes taking place particularly in
retailing while at the same time paying homage to the basics of the
business:
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"To be able to anticipate changes in distributive channels
and in where customers buy (and how, which is equally
important) one has to be in the marketplace, has to watch
customers and non-customers, has to ask 'dumb
questions.' It is almost 40 years since I first advised
executives to 'walk around'- that is, get out of their
offices, visit and talk to their associates in the company.
This was the right advice then; now it is the wrong thing
to do, and a waste of the executive's scarcest resource, his
time. For now we know how to build upward information
into the organization. ...The right advice to executives
now is to walk outside."7
What the Clubs Sell and How They Sell it
The typical club store carries a wide variety of items, from fresh
muffins baked on the premises to new tires for your car. Selection
within any category is, however, limited; they have an inventory
that is wide, not deep. The clubs will usually have 2,000-3,000
stock keeping units (SKU's) in a 105,000 SF store and will carry on
average no more than two competing brands of any product. The
brands they do carry may change from week to week, as the clubs
rely on their buyers to make the best deal possible at that given
time. The savings are carried through to the purchaser.
The pricing policies of the clubs consistently fall under the
category of Everyday Low Pricing (ELP), meaning that they do not
run special sales or promotions, but instead try to instill in the
consumer the sense that their prices are always at rock bottom. The
clubs do little, if any, direct advertising. Their geographic roots are
in the South and West, and to date they have relied on non-union
7 Drucker, Peter F. Managing for the Future: The 1990's and Beyond Truman
Talley Books/Dutton New York March, 1992.
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labor among employees. As destination-oriented retailers, they do
not feel it necessary to compete for top-dollar traditional sites
within malls. They often locate adjacent to existing centers, but
believe that they can be just as successful in a light industrial area
that offers good access and the proper demographics. These
elements combine to give the clubs a pricing structure well below
that of most if not all traditional retailers
The Players and Their Plans
The largest warehouse clubs, and those expected to most impact the
Massachusetts market, are Sam's Club, a division of Wal-Mart; Pace,
a division of KMart; Price Club; Costco; and BJ's Wholesale Club, a
division of Waban, Inc. and formerly a division of TJX. Together
they have approximately 609 units open across the country; in the
nascent Massachusetts market, stretched to include Southern New
Hampshire, there are currently fifteen clubs operating, with another
three scheduled to open this calendar year.
Future predictions of openings are extremely difficult due to
the clubs' habits of tying up numerous potential sites in anticipation
of problems with assemblage, permitting, and/or zoning. The long
lead time necessary to develop relatively large parcels of real estate
and the likelihood of some failure in this densely populated and
tightly regulated area mandates that clubs sometimes pursue
different sites within the same marketplace with the intent of
dropping some of the sites down the line. It was confirmed,
however, that BJ's plans at least three more stores in this trade area
over the next two years. PACE Club is targeting the area for at least
three stores, and Sam's and Costco are both currently working on
more locations. The Price Club, troubled by the recession in its core
West Coast market, has one store in Seekonk but is not actively
expanding in this market now. Best estimates from interviews with
local brokers, investment firms, and the clubs themselves show the
clubs looking at as many as 22 new sites in this market. (Exhibit II)
The clubs feel that they have found an excellent formula, and
both their members and Wall Street agree. From 1980 to 1990 the
stock of Wal-Mart stores, owner of Sam's Club, increased by 3,767%;
Price Company's stock increased by 2,273%.8 Started in 1976 with
Price Club's first store in San Diego, the warehouse club industry has
grown to a $21 billion per year business.
The real estate decisions of the clubs, as well as the decisions of
their developers, are indicative of the clubs' hunger to penetrate the
Massachusetts market. For the last three years the clubs, along with
the home improvement "big box" companies, have been virtually the
only players in a land market decimated by the local real estate
depression. Prices of up to one million dollars per acre for
unimproved land in cities like Medford, Quincy, and Danvers were
commonplace in a market that offered no other potential players for
the sites. These users were competing only with themselves; there
was no secondary level of underlying uses for the land, and they
served to drive up prices for each other. In these densely built-up
communities, the clubs have purchased sites that had been bypassed
8Laffer, A.B., "Specialty Retailing in the 1990's "V.A. Canto & Associates, p. 2,
April 19, 1990. Wal-Mart's results reflect those of the entire company,
including Wal-Mart Department Stores, during this period.
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for years by other users as having too much sitework expense or not
enough exposure or access. In most cases, the companies are flush
with cash from their stock offerings and purchase their sites
outright; it is inconceivable that they would have been able to
finance these purchases in any conventional manner in today's
environment. The clubs clearly believe that these costs are di
minimus relative to the operating profits that are to be earned in
this marketplace.
The warehouse clubs have learned from some past real estate
mistakes, judging from their most recent transactions in
Massachusetts. As their prototype store quickly grew from
+/- 70,000 SF to today's 105,000 SF, the clubs were left with many
stores of less than optimal size. Some were closed, even when lease
payments had to continue, and operations were moved to larger
quarters. In hopes of avoiding such costly moves in the near future,
all clubs are now requiring expansion capabilities of up to 150,000
SF of their sites. Additionally, the clubs are known to negotiate
extremely loose use clauses for their leased spaces, to allow for the
changes in format and merchandise that are inevitable in the
changing retail arena.
Developer's Concerns
A number of developers I spoke with were extremely concerned
with the prices paid in rent or occupancy costs by the clubs, so much
so that most said they much prefer building for a fee or selling sites
outright to the clubs. In the industry shakeout many see as
inevitable, they do not want to be left owning buildings of 100,000+
23
SF with a mortgage based on spiked rental projections. One
experienced developer, who happens to have a substantial equity
interest in a major supermarket chain, has just completed
negotiations to sell a site in his "power center" development to one
of the Big Five clubs at a price equating to net rent of $14.00 per SF
per year. Despite the legendary benefits of owning real estate, this
developer was more than happy to sell the piece; in fact he insisted.
With low margins of 8-10 percent, volume is one key to the
success of the club format. The average sales per store for the
industry in 1991 was $60.8 million; the averages among the five
clubs listed above ranged from a low of $44.6 million (PACE) to a
high of $99.3 million (Price Club). This data does not take into
account differences in average store size among clubs as many
upgrade older, smaller stores to today's prototypes, but rough
figures translate to an annual sales per square foot average of close
to $600 with many individual units running in the $1,000 range.
Significantly, many studies using exit interviews of club shoppers
have put the average distance traveled to shop the club at 13-15
miles; most clubs and developers acknowledge a drawing area of 25
miles or more in radius, dependent upon population densities,
transportation networks, and proximity to other clubs.
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Market Penetration and Saturation
Currently the emerging Massachusetts market has one warehouse
club for every 421,500 people9. In Boston, approximately 69% of
the population is aware of the clubs; in Los Angeles and Dallas/Ft.
Worth, where the clubs are considered to be mature, the figures are
82% and 79%, respectively. These numbers imply that Boston might
be approaching the other two markets in terms of "awareness."
Membership levels, however, tell a much different story. In Boston,
an estimated 21% of the population has a membership with a club,
and only 17% actually shopped at a club in the past year. In
contrast, Los Angeles' membership rate was 41% and their shopping
9 Combined MSA's of Boston, Worcester, Springfield, New Bedford, (MA) and
Manchester, Nashua, and Portsmouth, (NH)/ existing clubs, or 6,322,500/15.
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rate was 36%; Dallas/Ft. Worth's membership rate was 51%, their
shopping rate 41%. It is reasonable to assume that there is some lag
between consumers awareness of the clubs' existence and their
ultimate decision of whether or not to join a club. As more clubs
open in more convenient locations in Massachusetts, the
membership and shopping rates will undoubtedly rise. The
prediction of Dr. Tigert's study is that this market will be in a
growth stage until it reaches maturity, defined as when 31% to 41%
of the adult population actually shops at a club.
Who Shops at the Clubs and for What?
Just what merchandise the warehouse clubs sell and to whom is an
interesting matter. Originally these clubs were focused primarily on
the small business user who needed goods in bulk for breakdown
and re-sale. Restaurants and convenience stores were major
customers, buying caseloads of goods on a cash basis for their own
businesses. They were truly wholesale clubs selling industrial-sized
portions. Today, however, approximately 70% of club members are
individuals, with the remainder being small businesses of all kinds.
A study led by Douglas J. Tigert, Phd., professor of Retailing at
Babson College, which surveyed 2,150 active warehouse club
members in eleven different cities including Boston, found that the
average warehouse club shopper spends approximately $160.00 per
trip and shops the club once every three weeks.10 Of this amount,
$90.00 (56%) was grocery-based; the remaining $70.00 (44%) was
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10 Tigert, et al, p. iv.
highly concentrated among paper products, cleaning/ laundry
supplies, health and beauty aids, clothing, office supplies/stationery,
audio/visual supplies, and books. This 50-60% concentration in
grocery sales was consistent with all other studies and interviews.
Among many items less frequently purchased by household
shoppers, but which capture significant market share in their fields,
are major appliances and electronics, small appliances, cigarettes,
toys, and tires. In contrast, business cardmembers' non-food
purchasing is totally dominated by office supplies and stationery.
Overall food spending in dollars was dominated by households over
businesses by a ratio of 8:1; non-food spending favored the
household again, this time by a ratio of 4:1. These figures denote a
trend away from the old definition of these clubs as "wholesalers,
not retailers."
It is clear from the clubs' shift to smaller (but still larger than
those traditionally found in supermarkets), more convenient
packaging sizes and their current emphasis on perishables like meat,
fresh vegetables and baked goods that these clubs are choosing the
general consumer over the small businessman as their target for
growth. Indeed, Dr. Tigert's study concludes in bold type that
"WAREHOUSE MEMBERSHIP CLUBS COULD LIVE MORE EASILY
WITHOUT THE BUSINESS CUSTOMER THAN WITHOUT THE
HOUSEHOLD CARDHOLDER." 1 ' Not all studies are in complete
agreement on this point. A smaller study of customers at six
different clubs, three in South Florida and three in suburban
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llTigert, et al, p. viii.
Chicago, was undertaken by James M. Degen & Company, Inc. This
study concludes that while business shoppers may constitute a
smaller segment of overall membership, their average purchase
amount per trip is double that of households and that they also shop
the clubs twice as frequently. Less emphasis should be placed on
this survey for several reasons. First, it was conducted in early
1990, and is outdated in an industry as young and rapidly changing
as the clubs'. Secondly, the survey is much smaller than Tigert's,
comprised of exit surveys from less than three hundred shoppers at
six stores in only two states. Third, the study differentiates between
purchases for the household and the business place simply by
asking how the membership card was procured; in fact many
business card holders not only shop for both the business and the
home but, as small business owners, may be presumed to consume
more than the public in general.
All of these elements combine to make these big boxes a much
different place to shop than your traditional supermarket or
discount store. As they saturate an area, the clubs are forced to
compete not only with traditional retailers but with each other. Yet
differentiation among themselves is difficult in an industry
dominated by so few players. Designs and layouts are remarkably
similar, and when someone does come up with a new idea, it is
easily copied within the format of the "big box". As merchandise is
most frequently purchased by the clubs on a "best deal" basis, there
is no brand loyalty established with the customer nor the
manufacturer. Along with private labels, the fresh food/perishables
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department is a prime area of in-store growth for the clubs that
allows them to differentiate themselves from the other clubs.
The rush to fresh foods departments, defined as either a meat,
fresh vegetable, or bakery department, is swift and almost complete.
Virtually all of Costco's 100 opened stores had fresh foods as of
January 1, 1992, and Pace and BJ's were at 97% and 95%
respectively nationwide. This is up from previous year percentages
of 88.5% and 72 % for respectively. The other clubs show similar
trends.12 The trend has been to add fresh foods to all existing club
stores that do not currently have them, and to incorporate them in
the design of all new stores. Nearly every store opened in the
Massachusetts market over the last three years offers fresh foods,
and many are expanding those sections by adding departments.
Because the majority of the meat and produce sold in all venues,
including supermarkets, is unbranded, this is an area where the
clubs can really differentiate between themselves based on quality,
freshness, and pricing.
What the Warehouse Club Shoppers Don't Like
The primary complaint of club shoppers is the waiting.
Shoppers must wait in line with their various items as they are
checked at the register. By the nature of club shopping the packages
are cumbersome and each customer may have a large number of
items. After being checked at the register items are again checked,
this time by a security guard, before members are allowed to exit.
1 2Dean Witter Reynolds Research, Spring 1992 Table I.
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As in all retail operations, it is management's job to predict the flow
of customers and staff the store according to peak and off-peak
times. It has been suggested that at times the clubs' maniacal
fixation on margins has kept them from assigning adequate checkout
personnel.
The second most cited complaint by club shoppers was that
they wanted smaller packaging. The large sizes and quantities were
either more than they needed, more than they could store, or more
than they could physically handle. Many different studies note that
although the elderly are the fastest growing segment of the United
State's population, they are not a major user of the clubs. This is
due, it is thought, to their inability to either carry or use the size
items typically offered at the clubs. The long walks, from a car
parked in a lot containing 500 spaces, and within a 100,000+ SF
store, were also often cited as negatives. Overall, the third most
frequently mentioned negative aspect of club shopping was
overcrowding. In Boston, however, it ranked only fifth, mentioned
by 9% of respondents. It was behind both brand inconsistency,
annual fees, and slow check out among Boston club shoppers.
While Dr. Tigert's survey does not measure the depth of these
drawbacks, it should be clear that virtually all of the higher ranking
negative factors actually define the clubs. The positive of shopping
at the club, perceived savings, is gained by the clubs' maintaining a
tight reign on costs. This means low employee/sales ratios, bulk
packaging,best-buy purchasing, and self service by the customer
wherever possible. I believe that the fact that Boston respondents
placed almost a two-to-one higher negative on the annual fees than
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the survey reflects the fact that the recent evolution of the clubs
makes them appear more like traditional retailers, and invites
consumers to question the validity of the membership fee.
The clubs opened here are the latest evolutionary phase of
clubs, emphasizing the baked goods, fresh vegetable and meats, and
optical services that cater to the traditional retail customer. The
margins on these sectors must be lower than in the big ticket areas
like consumer electronics and paper products simply due to the
extra employees needed to handle the fresh goods and the losses
due to spoilage. After interviews, it is my conclusion that the clubs
are using the fresh perishables sector as a draw to attract members
who, it is assumed, will pay the membership fee and make other
major purchases over time. As the clubs move closer to offering a
more traditional retail merchandise mix, as they have in Boston,
consumers will begin to equate them with retailers and question the
membership fee. Retail executives interviewed expressed a strong
belief that the first casualty of competition among the clubs will be
the membership fee.
The average membership fee of $25 represents 1 1/2% of a
$1,560 annual grocery bill (average household food purchase of
members x average trips), paid up-front. Even from the beginning,
not everyone paid for their memberships. Tigert's study showed
that fully one third of the members received their first card free,
and further that 19% have never paid for a membership. The study
also shows that the clubs would lose approximately 1/3 of their
membership should they decide to raise the fee by $10; if they
raised it by $25 to a total of $50, they would lose approximately 2/3
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of their existing members. In Tigert's study, this $25 increase in the
fee equates to approximately 20% of the annual savings shoppers
perceive themselves obtaining through club purchases. 13 Losing 2/3
of total membership over a $25 increase, which represents only 10%
of consumers' own estimation of savings suggests both a fairly steep
demand/price elasticity curve and a perception of better
alternatives at that level.
III. The Hunted: Industries Affected by the Big Boxes
Grocery Stores
Clearly warehouse clubs will have a major impact on the
grocery stores industry. With up to 60% of a club's annual sales in
the grocery department, an area in which a club opens may see as
much as $60,000,000 in annual sales go to a new competitor.14
Their 10% gross margins dwarf the grocery industry average of 23-
25%, and their lower distribution costs and the clubs' generally low
overhead seem to guarantee a virtual lock on the low price market.
With between 20,000 and 40,000 SKU's for a larger store, the
supermarkets offer more variety, but at what price?
The clubs are a real, new threat to the groceries, and it is
bigger than some industry members would like to admit. But in
13Tigert, et al, p. 133. Club member's own perception of savings vs. prices at
traditional retailers is 16%.
14 Tigert, et al, p. 47.
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Massachusetts, it is neither the only nor the newest threat, and the
groceries do have their strengths.
Research by independent analysts as well as the grocery chains
themselves show that the overwhelming majority of people shop for
their groceries within 2-3 miles of where they live, and that the
superstore format (50,000-70,000 SF) has a drawing radius of 5-7
miles, and smaller stores up draw up to 3 miles, depending on
competition, road network, etc. The groceries have a franchise in
existing prime locations in established markets with long-time
patrons. Long term leases with options to renew and in some cases
outright ownership of store locations will provide an excellent
platform from which these grocery chains can defend their turf,
especially when contrasted with the higher rents and land costs the
clubs have underwritten. A typical supermarket rent may be in the
$5.00-7.00 range, with some old leases requiring under $3.00 per SF.
Why do people shop where they do for groceries, and what are
they looking for from the store? Surveys show that the single most
important element in choosing a supermarket is its proximity to the
consumer's residence. In fact, approximately 50% of all groceries
are purchased within one mile of the consumer's home. 15 The
second store choice element is price, followed by assortment,
quality, and service. One would not expect those orders to change
given today's emphasis on the value of time in two earner
households, the overall consumer quest for value, and health
15 Dean Witter Reynolds Research, Table 5.
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considerations. Remember, most people shop for groceries on
average 2 1/2 times per week.
The Health of the Supermarket Industry
The executives at the three local grocery chains I interviewed for
this paper - Stop & Shop and Shaw's, the two leading major
supermarkets, and Roache Brothers, a fourteen store chain - all had
relatively similar views on the clubs' impact on their industry. All
of these chains do a majority of their business in this marketplace
and all are headquartered here. Shaw's and Stop & Shop have been
competing with the clubs in other markets for over five years.
Trade associations like the Food Marketing Institute provide
members with comprehensive data on nationwide industry trends.
There are other significant trends affecting the local grocery
business which, while unrelated to the clubs, must be considered.
The Massachusetts supermarket industry is an extremely
competitive one in which, by all accounts, it is extremely difficult to
turn a profit. In interviews, it was acknowledged that grocery
stores in the area are probably only breaking even on their sale of
merchandise; within their range of merchandise, margins are
typically higher for non-food items such as seasonal accessories
(beach chairs, barbecue grills, etc.). The supermarkets make their
money by the leasing of their shelf space to their suppliers. That is,
Campbell Soup Company pays a certain amount of money per month
for the shelf space its products occupy. The rates are dependent
upon the location within the store and the shelf height; easily
accessible eye level space near other popular departments would be
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relatively more expensive than space at knee level in the rear
corner of the store. End caps, those ubiquitous battlegrounds for the
Coke vs. Pepsi wars, are also most expensive. The grocery store
itself is run as a smaller version of a mall, with more desirable
selling locations generating more sales and with the ultimate control
of these spaces resting with the supermarket management.
Predictions of a static population with little increase in
disposable income are not the only problems the groceries face. The
national health movement has surfaced in supermarkets as a switch
away from higher margin red meats to lower profit substitutes like
fish and chicken. The recession has caused shoppers of at least two
of the chains to buy less per trip and also to trade down in both
quality and quantity. This of course lowers the chain's gross and
net. Another competitive weapon gaining favor over the last three
years, apparently without the prompting of club competition, is
"double couponing." In double couponing, a store will offer to
double the face amount of manufacturer's coupons when redeemed
at their stores, hoping to induce shoppers interested in those
products to make those purchases and others at their stores. Once
thought of as a small-store gimmick, double couponing is now a
necessity among all players in the market.
How the Groceries View the Threat of the Club
Virtually all of the groceries see the influx of the clubs as inevitable
and their impact as being important. None viewed the clubs as
being either unique or invincible, or even revolutionary. Many
recalled the Gemco stores of the 1950's and 60's, which were in fact
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run as a division by the company that is now Stop & Shop. These
Gemco's were virtually identical to the warehouse clubs of today,
with some minor differences. They were large, warehouse formats
selling wholesale-sized quantities. Bradlee's Food Stores were
located adjacent to those Gemco's that did not have food
departments within. When these stores were forced through
competition to increase their hours of operation and add services
like bagging, their margins began to look like those of regular
grocers and the Gemco's eventually went out of business.
The basic arithmetic is simple. Clubs draw from 25 miles, with
an average trip of 13 miles; supermarkets draw from 5-7 miles,
with an average trip of 2 miles. Using averages, the trading area of
a club is 42 times that of a supermarket.16 Put another way, there
might be 42 supermarkets within the area of influence of one club.
The club's impact is spread out over many stores, and while it has
been assumed that those groceries closest to the clubs lose the most
sales, that idea is being tested aggressively in Massachusetts by both
Edwards, a low price chain owned by Purity Supreme, and Stop &
Shop, the area's dominant chain. Both of these chains have made
decisions to locate stores in community centers where clubs already
operate. They hope to capture the shoppers the club draws who
cannot find everything they need within the club's grocery section.
16 Trading areas are circular; the area of a circle is (psi x radius) squared.
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The Grocers Fight Back
Many of the chains, while not expecting the clubs to simply fail, are
expressing doubt in their ability to deliver perishables at the
margins and in the volumes upon which their existence is based.
Extra care in the form of manpower is required to keep meat,
vegetables, and baked goods fresh enough to retain customers. This
is an important point when taken in conjunction with the warehouse
clubs' upscale, value-oriented member prototype. At the same time,
they are attempting to pare their own margins, and are not afraid to
make merchandise changes to keep pace.
All grocery chain executives interviewed acknowledged a
general pattern of growth in the size of their average stores. In the
case of Roache Brothers, who run a smaller than average, more
upscale store to begin with, they are going to an average of over
30,000 square feet with their latest store at 46,000 SF. The Super
Stop & Shop format is now 64,000 SF with an upward trend. An
interesting approach that many grocery chains are taking is to clear
an aisle of lesser selling items, such as cosmetics, and put in a
"power alley" of club-sized quantities of some of the best selling
items in the warehouses at low prices.
Many independent studies have shown that on any given day,
some items, particularly those that are couponed, are priced lower at
a grocery than the clubs, but that overall everyday prices are
substantially lower at the clubs. The chains I interviewed contend
that, with double coupons, a smart shopper will find equal or better
deals at the supermarket. The chains have also given more shelf
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life, sometimes a month or more, to specials and coupons that used
to run only one week so that shoppers could take better advantage.
The chains all voiced their belief that the clubs, while
competition in one sense, were not direct competitors and that to
focus solely on them would be suicidal. Their cost and profit
structures are so different that they cannot play each other's game
and be successful. The grocers rightly state that you cannot get a
full order at a club, and point to the fact that the average club
shopper visits once every three weeks while their average customer
visits 2 1/2 times per week.
An example of how the grocers have attempted to lessen the
impact of the clubs comes from Roache Brothers' Bob Anand, Sr.
Roache Brothers has a 20, 000 SF mid-to-high end store in Randolph,
Massachusetts. For the past five years, their main competition for
grocery dollars was a Shaw's, also in Randolph, which was a lower
price store. Profit wise, the Roache Bros. store was "a good store,"
according to Anand. When the Hilltop Steakhouse opened a meat
department in Braintree, approximately 4 miles East of their store in
late 1990, Roache saw volume go down a little in their meat
department. Then in 1991 both a Costco and a BJ's Wholesale Club
opened within four miles of Roache Bros. Sale were down
approximately 10% over last years numbers for the first four
months after the clubs opened. Roache Bros. then went to offering
double coupons, something they had never done at the Randolph
store. For the next four months, their volume went back up over
their last year's same month sales. Admittedly, they had cut their
profit margins to maintain volume, but it is in their opinion an
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acceptable trade off. Anand is certain that the customers he got due
to double couponing were from Shaw's his real competitor, and just
as sure that the 10% he initially lost to the club will stay at the club
for the foreseeable future.
Another important factor the grocers emphasize is the notion of
brand loyalty among food shoppers. The clubs, with their fanaticism
for savings, their "best buy" purchasing strategies and their
penchant for bringing out private labels of successful products will
only truly capture the lowest price shopper but otherwise alienate
not only brand-conscious consumers but the manufacturers
themselves. Indeed Ocean Spray, once a major supplier of cranberry
based products to over 100 Sam's Clubs, was stung when Sam's came
out with their own private label cranberry drink and dropped Ocean
Spray. "Sam's Choice" private label goods take up as much as 10% of
the shelf space in the grocery and food and drug sections of a Sam's
Club. Many of the grocery industry executives I spoke with voiced
concerns that they were not getting fair and equal treatment from
suppliers on such issues as pricing, sizing, and split deliveries. They
feel that the clubs have beaten down suppliers to the point where
the grocers are subsidizing some of the deals that the clubs enjoy.
The grocers feel that unless this situation is improved, their leverage
will lie in their ability to control the shelf space within their stores.
That is, when a supplier gets out of line, they would retaliate by
cutting down either the quality or quantity of the shelf space leased
to that supplier. One senior level manager said, " Wait until they
come to me with a new product they want to introduce to the
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market. If I feel that they are favoring the clubs' business at the
expense of mine, they won't get any space."
Unit Pricing Laws
According to some grocery industry executives, Massachusetts'
reputation as a pro-consumer government is sullied when it comes
to the treatment afforded the clubs. By all accounts, most members
join and shop at clubs for the perceived savings, of which there are
many indeed. However numerous studies show that not all prices
are the lowest, neither in the absolute nor on a unit basis. The
problem is, there is no way for the consumer to compare at this
point. While all supermarkets are subject to Massachusetts Unit
Pricing Laws which mandate that every item on their shelf, no
matter what the package size, must be accompanied by a breakdown
of the items price per unit of weight. This is to allow shoppers to
more easily identify the best value, measured as a price per unit,
among the fourteen ounce can @ $1.29 and the eighteen ounce can @
$1.69. While good for the consumer, this obviously adds cost to the
chains which is then passed through to the consumer.
When BJ's was establishing a foothold in Massachusetts, they
argued to the state that they were not a grocery retailer but a
wholesaler, and since they sold only by one size anyway there
would be no in-store comparison for customers to use. They were
granted an exemption from the Unit Pricing Laws. Not only does
this allow them to keep their margins below those of supermarkets,
it does not allow consumers to truly judge the savings they are
making by buying in bulk. Presumably if the consumer sees only a
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marginal savings to put up with the inconvenience of long lines, the
waste of space in having to store the excess product, and the loss of
the time value of their money tied up in extra goods, they may see
less reason to travel the extra miles to the club. The grocery
industry is lobbying very hard to have the clubs' exemption
overturned.
Head On Crash: The Warehouse Club and Office Supply
Stores
While the business club members are a smaller fraction of total
membership (+/- 30%) and shop less frequently than household
members, they also spend significantly more per trip. In Dr. Tigert's
study the breakdown was $217 for business buyers and $165 for
household members, a increase of 32%. The overall breakdown of
dollar flow spent in the clubs runs 8.3 to 1 in favor of the household
buyer; on the non-food side that gap is lessened to 4 to 1. What are
the businesses purchasing with this $217? A smaller percentage of
business members purchased food, and most of these items were the
coffee/dairy products, soft drinks and soda, and salty snack
products associated with employee coffee brakes. Of the non-food
items, the vast majority of money was spent on office supplies and
stationary.
When a large list of products was given to respondents to note
what they purchased during their last trip to a club, 147%17
mentioned that they had bought something that fell into the
17 Because numerous products within one category were mentioned in the
survey, results can total more than 100%.
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category of office supplies/stationery. These were items like
computer paper, envelopes or stationery, telephones, fax machines,
etc. The next highest answer, paper products, received a 39% total
response; in fact the next six categories, including laundry and
cleaning supplies, paper/plastics, health and beauty aids, auto
accessories and hand tools only totaled 119% together.
The impact of the clubs here will be most pronounced on the
small, high margin local office supply/stationery store. Here, as in
the other fields like grocery and home improvement, margins will
be cut everywhere including the larger office supply stores.
However the really interesting thing to watch will be how the
warehouse clubs themselves fair against the category killers like
Staples, Office Max and Office Depot. Staples, based in
Massachusetts, has a strong position here but Office Max has
recently made some aggressive inroads here. These stores carry a
much wider and deeper selection of merchandise at prices just as
sharp as the clubs, and they are locating in much more convenient
patterns than the clubs. Their typical store is approximately 20,000
SF and can be found in either a community or neighborhood center
or in a free standing building in a more industrial area. They will
certainly be more widespread than the clubs, demanding less travel
time and no membership fees of purchasers. The clubs' only distinct
advantage over the category killers in this industry is their wider,
but not deeper, selection of non-office supply merchandise, and this
can be overcome by the category killers locating in shopping centers
that also offer these agglomeration benefits. These centers are
known as "power centers."
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The Threat to Discount Department Stores
The discount department store industry is undergoing change.
These discount stores sell a wide range of various quality branded
merchandise at low price points. Sales per square foot in the
discount industry average around $200 per SF. The majority of
these stores are anchors in community centers, with a few such as
Sears anchoring regional centers.
The national consumer trend towards a tighter price/value
relationship plays into the traditional strengths of the discount
department stores. Nationally, the discount stores share of the
overall retail market was at 16.2% in 1980, fell to 11.6% in 1985,
and was at 17.3% and rising at the end of 1990. Unfortunately
many of the traditional discounters are in no shape to respond. This
is especially true in Massachusetts, where the ailing Bradlee's and
Sears chains dominate the discount market.
According to many of the industry executives interviewed, the
discount industry has its roots firmly planted in the stingy New
England soil. The Yankee penchant for "adaptive re-use" is
legendary, if not entirely accurate. Filene's Basement, Marshall's,
Ames, Ann & Hope, Mammoth Mart, Hills, Zayre's and Bradlee's
Gemco, the original warehouse club are but a few of the examples of
New England's discount retailing prowess mentioned.
The problem was that during the 1980 many of these stores
stopped being discounters. Their margins ballooned to 24-26% as
layers of management were added. Many like Ames and Hills were
saddled with huge debt as a result of overly aggressive acquisitions
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and LBO's. At the same time, mail order catalogues and outlet malls
were attacking the discounters primary customers. The result was
that many of the traditional discounters lost their focus.
However, as a retailing format there is little wrong with the discount
department store. In fact the press has mistakenly lumped some of
the best performers in the industry in with the warehouse big
boxes. Wal-Mart and KMart stores are traditional discount
department stores that have experienced strong growth throughout
the 1980's. Inflation-adjusted productivity results for the years
1982-1990, measured by sales per square foot, show annual
compound increases of 8.1% and 6.7%, respectively. Their numbers
of store units have increased dramatically over the past five years,
and each has targeted the Massachusetts market for growth.
While not warehouse format boxes, these better discount
department stores do have some similarities with the boxes. They
are large, typically averaging between 80,000 and 105,000 SF, and
they offer more flexibility in size ranges than the boxes.
Entrepreneurial skills are pushed as store managers are encouraged
to carry up to 15% of inventory as local merchandise. Venture
Stores, a spin-off from the May Department Store chain, has
increased checkout speed by 13.5% by instituting cashier production
standards with incentives. Wal-Mart offers an ESOP to all
employees, from the stock clerks to the CEO. The best discount
department stores use the same state of the art POS inventory
controls the boxes, in fact the same as all of todays successful
retailers.
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The very real threat to the Massachusetts discount department
industry is that the better operators like KMart and Wal-Mart will
unseat them here. There is a very real chance of this occuring, but
even if it does it will not be damaging to the industry in general, the
consumer, or the shopping center owners. While Bradlee's is
generally regarded as a poor to middling operator, their locations in
this market are second to none, and they own a significant portion of
them. Industry experts interviewed for this thesis thought it
inconceivable that even the best operator would enter the market
on a head to head basis with Bradlee's and incur the inevitable
competitive bloodletting that would occur. A more likely scenario
would be that Wal-Mart or KMart, after getting comfortable with the
market by opening and operating some stores around the perimeter,
would make a play for the weakened Bradlee's franchise.
The Threat to Department Stores
The department store industry went through a period similar to that
of the discount stores in the 1980's. While financial machinations
weakened many of the oldest and most respected names in the
business, those department stores which kept their focus on
operations came through strongly. From the period 1982-1990, May
Department stores and Dillard's increased their productivity,
measured by inflation-adjusted sales per SF, by 8.0% and 6.1%
respectively. Nordstrom's is another department store which has
prospered throughout this period. According to Stores magazine's
annual issue of the top 100 retailers, the traditional department
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stores share of the overall retail market was at 11.7% in 1980,
peaked at 13.4% in 1985, and has settled at 12.9% today.
The threat to the department store industry is not from the
boxes. All department stores have de-emphasized their hardgoods
lines virtually to the point of nonexistence. Most have fewer
"departments" than they may have fifteen years ago, but those that
they do have are have more selection and better relative pricing
than in the past. And of course they have new departments with
the latest trends, such as young learning centers with electronic
instruction facilities. Many manufacturers are tied to the
department stores with exclusive merchandising arrangements,
whereby for example only Filene's Department Stores would be able
to carry Liz Claiborne's line within a certain trade area.
The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) has spent
considerable effort researching the department store industry.
Although the popular press gave wide coverage to the closing of
some department stores due to the mergers of the 1980's, the ICSC's
data shows that 60% of these locations were reopened as
department stores within three months of closing, and a full 85%
were reopened in less than a year. They suggest that the remaining
15% are located in centers that do not currently have the
demographics to support a department store. Most are in centers
that were prematurely developed in advance of a emerging market
areas, typically in the California, Texas, and Florida markets.
On shopper trends, the ICSC has determined that the typical regional
and super regional shopper spends the same amount per trip today
as in 1985, but that the average length of trip has fallen by about 30
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minutes. This supports the theory of the more focused, time
constrained shopper of the 1990's. They have also found that when
surveyed, consumers cite as the three most important reasons for
shopping where they do as location, convenience, and selection.
According to the ICSC, this has basically remained consistent for the
past ten years. The department store anchors located in regional
and super regional malls remain the most efficient method of
delivering the desired mix of merchandise in a logical and orderly
environment.
IV. Big Box Category Killers: The Home Improvement
Industry
The home improvement sector looks to be a "home run" in the
1990's, and while the big boxes have the momentum in the race,
they do not have the lead yet. However, they are only an
acquisition or two away. Consolidation in the industry is inevitable
and essential. Today, the big boxes have the retailing format while
the Grossman's and Somerville Lumbers have location and customer
history. The major players in this segment among the big boxes are
Home Depot; Homeclub; HQ a division of Hechingers; and Builders'
Square, a division of KMart.
The home improvement industry is going through an evolution
of its own. It is currently one of the most fragmented sectors of
retailing, dominated by hundreds of smaller local firms. The top
three companies nationwide control less than 15% of the entire
home improvement market. Industry executives from both the big
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box and traditional companies predict three trends. The first is a
consolidation of the players in the industry, as competition will force
the weaker, less competitive operators to combine. The second is an
overall expansion of the market, due to the demographics trends
already discussed. The third, a shift in the emphasis of retailers
target from the professional or semi-professional contractor toward
the amateur do it yourself (DIY) consumer, is a result of this
demographic shift.
Traditional home improvement firms like Grossman's and
Somerville Lumber have mostly viewed the DIY market as an
afterthought to their primary contractor customer. They operate
under a two-tiered pricing structure, offering lower prices and
better credit terms to the contractor. They even offer separate
areas within each store for contractors to conduct their business in,
with separate registers and in some cases different inventory. As a
consequence, their retail sections are suspected of subsidizing some
of the activities of the contractor business. Additionally, having
established locations long ago, they have a wide variance of store
sizes. Grossman's has retail stores in Massachusetts that vary in size
from 11,000 square feet up to 60,000 square feet. This creates a
problem in maintaining any consistency of inventory among its
stores. A Grossman's customer going to two different stores may
experience a tremendous difference in the products offered there.
This creates a further problem in maintaining consistent sales and
advertising information; much of the advantage of spreading
advertising dollars over multiple units is lost due to the fact that all
the stores carry different inventory levels.
48
A breakdown of merchandise sold supports this different focus.
Grossman's does approximately 60% of their dollar volume in
lumber and building supplies; the equivalent figure for the boxes is
approximately 20%. The traditionals have an outdoor drive-thru
area with register for contractors, while the boxes have an in-store
section for contractor sizes and qualities. The Home Depot has just
moved this section in all their stores from the rear to the right side,
to enable the contractors to more easily get in and out with their
larger purchases.
Part of this story is one of the management of growth.
Somerville and Grossman's started as large lumber yards with a
single, central location. Their growth came in the form of small
stores developed in a radial pattern being fed from central
inventory. Not wanting to cannibalize their original store market,
they spread to smaller, outlying areas, like the West Bridgewater
location of Somerville Lumber. As suburban growth spread and
densities got higher, they might add another small store to service
the new trade area, as the old store was just too small. Home Depot
had no such initial constraints; they have come into the market and
can locate stores using todays demographic patterns to put
themselves in a more lucrative position. The results are that Home
Depot's Avon store will offer better access and exposure on the same
Route 24 corridor as Somerville Lumber's smaller, less accessible
one.
These home improvement big boxes are buying better sites
than the traditional users currently have, and they are paying more
for the land. While John Roberts, Vice President of Real Estate for
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Home Depot admits that some of the high prices are due to an
"auction mentality", he feels that the prices are justified for a few
reasons. First, the boxes are being exposed to sites that only three
years ago would have been viewed as prime office or hotel sites
with commensurate price tags. With the cities and towns more
interested in office jobs and tax dollars, retailing uses with their
traffic generation would have been nixed. Secondly, while the land
costs are high, these firms are taking advantage of the lower
construction labor, lower development fees, and lower interest rates
of today. Thirdly, these firms are extremely well capitalized, with
Home Depot getting a recent round of debentures sold at a rate of
less than 5%. Home Depot's stock has risen 3,148% in the 1980's.
Grossman's, on the other hand, has teetered on the edge of
bankruptcy and had to endure a nasty battle over management
control for the past three years.
The Home Depot chain is generally credited with having
invented the most direct response to these trends; the other big
boxes have recognized the validity of their format and copied it.
Their prototype store is now 80-100,000 square feet, with an
average volume of $35-40 million.18 They target the DIY market
with a wide and deep array of inventory. Their operating format is
imbued with the type of culture often associated in the press with
the Wal-Mart Company. They have a visible, dynamic leader in
Bernard Marcus, who still addresses employees every week from
their in-house television studios with a segment entitled "Breakfast
18 Les Gilbert, "Prototype Store Set by Home Depot", HFD July 29, 1991
50
with Bernie." While in store employees are not on commission, they
do receive bonuses and all employees are actively encouraged to
participate in an ESOP offering them a 15% discount on stock
equaling up to 25% of their annual salary. Home Depot employees
are not sales clerks but generally industry professionals, carpenters,
and plumbers enticed by steady income and full benefits. Almost all
are full time employees. They undergo screening, including drug
testing, and training, which easily surpasses that of the traditional
stores.
There are differences in the way the big boxes operate relative
to the traditional retailers. Of course, a main difference is in
inventory; the boxes work with no central purchasing or
distribution, keeping all of the stock in the selling space at each
store, while the traditionals buy and distribute centrally, incurring
inventory costs. They use the newest technology in bar coding, POS
information and Just-in-Time Inventory to keep costs down. With
the velocity, or speed of turnover, that the boxes achieve, they
rarely incur any finance charge on their merchandise. It is sold to
the consumer before the payment is due. Additionally, as much as
15% of the merchandise in any Home Depot is discretionary, ordered
by the store manager to suit his customers needs. The more
professional sales staff is encouraged to stay on the floor and assist
customers with their needs, and the sales people do not work cash
registers or load merchandise. Nor do they stock shelves, one of the
traditional chores of sales clerks. All Home Depots are re-
inventoried overnight by a special staff trained for this sole purpose.
With so many items stocked, and with the customer typically unsure
as to the exact requirements of their needs, the sales staff is
spending 100% of their time servicing their customer. While Home
Depot does offer their own credit card, they not only pre-screen
their customer but actually sell their receivables immediately to an
outside company that runs their credit operation. They offer
delivery of items for a $25 charge, while Somerville Lumber
advertises free delivery. In defending this policy, Home Depot says
that they are not in the trucking or delivery business, and that the
average customer doesn't need delivery, and that those buying a
large order don't mind paying the charge because they know that
they are saving so much on the order. The big box industry points
to the free delivery of the traditionals as another area where the big
boxes have a cost advantage which they can pass through to the
consumer.
Another advantage that the big boxes have is their pricing
structure. They utilize an everyday low pricing (ELP).approach,
whereas the traditionals use a special sales approach. The home
improvement boxes, unlike the warehouse clubs, do advertise. Their
savings through ELP are realized via lower labor costs as a result of
not having to constantly change prices and in-store quantities for
the many sales the traditionals run. The traditional retailing
executives I interviewed acknowledged that the prices at the boxes
were lower, one stating that. "the warehouses scream 'Price! Price!
Price! while we say 'Quality."'
An observation made by both the traditional and big box home
improvement retailers is that the influx of the boxes into an area
will expand the market. It is believed that the boxes' high profiles,
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more modern format, and larger inventory act as an inducement to
more home improvement activity. The technology of the home
improvement industry is getting more user friendly at a rapid pace.
Many jobs, such as installing architectural glass block or replacing
entire window systems, have been designed for the DIY market and
now require minimal amounts of special skill.
The traditional home improvement retailers realize that they
are in for a struggle. Grossman's has competed with the big boxes in
California, Connecticut and Rhode Island going back as far as eight
years. They will fight by focusing more closely on their core
customer, the contractor. In the words of one CFO, they will try to
be wider and deeper in "the products we choose to compete in."
Their posture, however, is relegated to a defensive one. They will
have to close their smaller stores which admittedly cannot compete.
And they do not have the capital structure to open new stores in the
size or number of the boxes. They will certainly lose a portion of
their retail DIY sales to the boxes. Somerville and Grossmans will
have to become more efficient in all aspects of their operations to
survive at all. Most of the local lumberyards that used to be in
every town have already closed, the victims of the wave of
expansion from Grossman's and Somerville. Those that have
survived to this point are at the end of their useful economic lives.
Cannibalization: Box vs. Box
As of July, 1992, Home Depot's goal was to open 26 stores in
the Massachusetts market. Their siting criteria combines density,
road patterns, and the number of single family housing units in a
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given trade area. Roberts of the Home Depot states "We like as
many stores as possible in any market place. We will continue to
build to the limit of the market regardless of what our competition
or the economy does." Roberts cites their experience in Atlanta,
where as recently as four years ago they felt that their six stores
were ideal for that market; they now have thirteen, all of which are
doing at least as well as their poorest performer was doing before
the expansion. He points to the fact that Massachusetts population is
on average less mobile than most of the rest of the country, choosing
to remodel and add on rather than move, as a reason for needing so
many stores here.
Most of the big boxes prefer to own their real estate because
they believe that they can finance and build it more quickly and
cheaply. They realize that they must be creative to find the right
locations in Massachusetts. Not truly destination oriented, they need
more of a traditional retail location than do the warehouse clubs.
They will locate in a community or neighborhood center, if the right
characteristics are present, and also like proximity to regional malls.
Interestingly, these home improvement big boxes fairly scoff at the
idea of "power centers" in Massachusetts, believing that well-located
sites of sufficient size are impossible to find here. Roberts of the
Home Depot goes so far as to say that the definition of a power
center is so nebulous that today it is defined as "anything with one
of us in it."
The Massachusetts market will become an historic battleground
for these big boxes. It is the first market in the country in which
the two leaders, HQand Home Depot, go head to head. Home Depot
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has already cleaned up on Hechingers, HQs parent that had started
an extremely successful retailing format in the early 1980's.
Hechingers carried more of a higher end decorating store than a
home improvement store, was set up as a traditional retailer who
bought and owned their inventory and they operated out of a
70,000 SF format. When Home Depot came to places like Atlanta
with their big box warehouse format they not only drove Hechingers
out of the market but convinced them to start HQas a clone of Home
Depot.
As interesting as this battle will be the fight between the warehouse
clubs and the boxes. While both use the same format of no
inventory, low overhead, and warehouse stores, there are other
significant differences pointing toward domination of the field by
the category killers like Home Depot. First, they require no
membership fees. Second, they carry a wide and deep array of
items, as opposed to the clubs' commitment to carrying a small
selection within a category. Third, the category killers have a
commitment to consistency in branded merchandise; their
experience tells them that many people will only purchase certain
brands of power tools, for instance. The warehouse clubs will only
have the product their buyers have recently determined to be the
best buy.
V. The Question of Synergy
The question of whether or not these new big boxes create synergy
with any other type of center is as of yet unanswered. There is
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evidence that suggests that in some cases their is an increase of
business for an existing center when a power center opens, in some
cases there is a decrease, and other cases show no real impact.
Homart Development has attempted to answer this question by
monitoring the performance of selected super regional centers in
suburban Chicago.
The Fox Valley Mall is a four-anchor center of 1.25 million SF.
The anchors are Lord & Taylor, Marshall Field, Sears, and JC Penney.
In the period 1980-'85, the center had a compound growth rate in
sales of 6.4% vs. the MSA compound average of 5.8%. During the
period from 1985-'90, the competitive retail capacity of the area
doubled to a total of 4.2 million SF, with an estimated one million
square feet occupied by either warehouse clubs or category killers.
Compound growth rates for this period for the center were 8.5% for
the Fox Valley Mall, well above the MSA average of 6.8%. Fox Valley
was able to increase its growth premium even in the face of new
competition from the big boxes.
The Hawthorn Mall is a one million SF mall anchored by three
department stores. During the period from 1980-'85, Hawthorn
achieved a compound growth rate in sales of 10.7% vs. the 5.8% of
the MSA. The amount of retail space was increased by
approximately fifty percent over the next five years in the trade
area of the mall, estimated as a concentric circle with a radius of 25
miles. New entrants to the area included a Sam's Club and a Wal-
Mart, among many others. The compound sales growth rate for
Hawthorn Mall over the 1985-'90 period was 6.3%, lagging the
MSA's 6.8%. For reasons that Homart's research department was
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unable to determine, there was a negative impact on the existing
mall even though, in their opinion, all other factors were similar to
the Fox Valley Mall comparison.
The grocery stores are also experimenting with the concept of
synergy with the big boxes. Both Edward's and Stop & Shop in
Massachusetts have located within shopping centers with an existing
warehouse club, even sharing signage at the center entrance. The
reasons given for their location choices in these instances were, first,
it was the best available location within that market. Secondarily,
thay felt that they could draw some extra business by filling the full
orders of some the club shoppers who had traveled from outside the
supermarket's normal trade area. Thirdly, they would try to
compete with the clubs using coupons and advertised specials.
The warehouse format stores are so new to this area that there
are no real results in yet. In fact, as seen in Homart's research, the
question of synergy is still unanswered nationwide.
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VI. Conclusion: The Implications for Property Classes in
Massachusetts
The Massachusetts economy will recover, but not quickly and
not in the form of the mid-1980's explosive growth. Jobs will be
created in the medical fields, particularly biomedical, in education,
and among the vast small businesses that are the backbone of this
country. The hi-tech industry will no longer dominate our
perception of economy as it once did, and overall recovery should be
slow and unexciting over the next three to four years. Disposable
income and population will both remain relatively flat. Time
constraints and the search for both value and savings will exert
polarizing pressures on consumers. Overall, I expect to see a
continued bifurcation of soft goods and hard goods in the retail
sector, manifested by the further emphasis on higher margin fashion
goods at the regional mall with more volume oriented hard goods
located in adjacent "power centers". This is the precise plan that
Homart Development has for the recently purchased Natick Mall and
Shoppers World in Framingham. In the meantime, the clubs will be
proliferating at a dangerously high rate in an effort to gain
domination of this market. The saturation point, reached already in
areas like Dallas/Ft. Worth and Los Angeles, will cause the
cannibalization and pain endemic to the imbalance of supply and
demand factors in any business. With Sam's Club and Price Club, the
two largest companies in the business, already putting holds on any
Boston area expansion, signs exist that the saturation point may be
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close at hand. Predictions of consolidation within the club industry,
which as we have seen has taken place before, center around the
potential of folding BJ's strong local franchise into one of the other
major clubs.
The big boxes are yet another in the many evolutionary steps
retailers have taken over time in response to new technology,
changing demographics and tastes and trends. In remembering the
short, unhappy life of the Gemco's, the club format is not even new.
They are a response to consumers demands for a new, tighter
price/value relationship after the spending binge of the 1980's, and
their impact, both real and perceived, is surely magnified by the
recession. They are here to stay, but they will not take over the
world. When broken down, the warehouse clubs and the category
killers, including the home improvement industry used as an
example in this thesis, are fundamentally at odds with one another.
The clubs are trying to be a low cost one-stop shopping center for all
of one's general household needs. They try to be convenient not in
the sense of being located around the corner, but in the sense that
they can fill almost all of your needs, at least the ones they can
make money filling, with one trip. The category killers, on the other
hand, attack one aspect with religious fervor, like home
improvement, to the exclusion of all others. Neither of these two
strategies is particularly convenient. The clubs' waiting lines, large
store sizes, lack of consistency and "excitement" fly in the face of
today's calls for service and efficient use of shoppers time; the
category-killer concept requires an individual trip for each different
category of item desired, and they negate impulse buying across
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categories. In fact, of all the people interviewed for this thesis,
officially and unofficially, less than 5% actually shopped at
warehouse clubs.
A number of clubs will exist and flourish in the Massachusetts
marketplace. If as suggested by the Tigert study the saturation
point of membership is approximately 40% of the total population, a
figure of 722,550 memberships is reached 19. This membership will
be spread among the 37 units which will be open by 1994 if the
clubs proceed with their current plans. There will then be one club
in this market for every 170,000 people. As a reference, the area
currently with the highest level of saturation of clubs is Anchorage,
Alaska, with one club for every 75,600 residents; the area with the
lowest level of saturation is New York City, with one club for every
858,600 people.20 Which clubs thrive and which are shuttered will
be a function of how well they run their operations, how well they
buy, how well they distribute, and how well they sell their
merchandise. It will also depend upon how well they manage their
relationships. Their high volume strategy is dependant on precise
and timely POS information and cooperation from their
manufacturers. There is a real question as to how these
relationships will hold up in the face of the complaints from other
retailing formats and the manufacturers own fears of being
eventually replaced by the clubs' private labels.
19Combined MSA households of Boston, Worcester, Springfield, New Bedford,
(MA)and Manchester, Nashua, and Portsmouth, (NH).x .40.
2 0 Dean Witter Reynolds, Membership Warehouse Club Industry, Table 1,
Spring, 1992.
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The clubs cannot create an environment where they are all
things to all people. The very nature of their format will not allow
them to stock fill in items that do not turn over with sufficient
velocity yet that consumers need to get their full order of groceries
or office supplies. Their merchandising, according to Sol Price,
founder of the industry leading Price Club, involves "the intelligent
loss of business." Their excitement is created by the consumer not
knowing what brands or even what products might be among their
3,000 SKU's on any given week. They will take business from
everyone; a lot from the grocery chains, a good bit from the
discounters, and enough from all the small mom and pop stores to
close many of them. And then they will begin taking it from each
other.
Hardest Hit: The Community Centers
Grocery store revenues will initially be hurt the most, and some of
the weaker chains will probably fail, to be folded into the healthier
chains. Discount department stores that typically anchor community
centers along with the groceries will continue to suffer, as much
from poor capital structure and ineffective management than from
competition from the boxes. In both cases the percentage rents at
the community will be lessened as these retailers drop margins to
fight the big boxes. As anchor tenants in these centers, grocery
stores have been able to negotiate favorable lease terms. At
between 1%-2% of break-even on average, their percentage rents
are a miniscule portion of the centers rental income. The discount
department stores have similar percentage rent profiles so that their
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sacrifice of some profit to retain volume will not significantly impact
center value. A mild general devaluation may occur as a result of
this; it may have already occurred. But if the property contains the
proper fundamental elements of a good retail property it will retain
its value and could indeed increase in value as the center's
management replaces inefficient, outmoded operators with some of
today's better retailers.
The influx of smaller-sized category killers like Office Max, Bed
'n Bath, and Toys R Us, as well as the potential food and drug clubs
envisioned by Dr. Tigert will be able to step in to good retail
locations vacated by the losers. This scenario has already occurred
at the Fresh Pond Shopping Center in Cambridge. When Ames
Department Stores went under bankruptcy protection, they sought
to close their 75,000 SF store in Fresh Pond, although they still had
over ten years remaining on the lease. The location is superb,
considered by those in the retail trade as "100%." While the clubs
looked at the site as a premier location, they could not make their
format work within the confines of 75,000 SF; their merchandise
mix and volume requirements are so stringent, due to their 10%
margins, that even a 100% location would not be enough. Yet Fresh
Pond Shopping Center still came out a winner. They split the 75,000
SF into two units and leased half to Staples and half to Kids R Us,
both of whom are considered strong draws with great credit. And
both leases were well above what Ames would have been paying for
the next ten years.
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Regional and Super Regional Malls
Regional and super regional malls have incredibly strong franchises
in Massachusetts. Their focus on the fashion/apparel industry and
soft goods in general and the ability to create an exciting, one stop
shopping environment make them unique. Their huge size and
strong locations create a critical mass which when combined with
the permitting problems found today act essentially as barriers to
entry for competition. The continuing evolution of retailing will take
place for the most part within the confines of the enclosed mall.
Many of the department stores' recent problems relate to capital
structure and should be rectified by improving operations.
Neighborhood Centers
Neighborhood centers will not be impacted to a large extent by the
big boxes. While their basic tenancy is made up of grocery and
service stores, they are used by local residents on an almost daily
basis; consumers will not be willing to travel the ten to twenty miles
to get to the nearest club when all they need is $20.00 worth of
groceries and the dry cleaning for two days. The dynamics of
retailing will affect these centers, however as some grocery chains
falter due to the added pressure from the clubs. I expect that in
situations where a center meets the criteria of a good retail
property, as defined above, the void will be filled quickly and
profitably.
The business of retail is competitive, fast paced, and offers
limitless potential for profit. This environment is a laboratory for
new ideas, new fashions, new mousetraps. The big boxes are an
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extension of the newest ideas in retailing, combining the latest in
technology, demographic trends, and merchandising. As I have
attempted to show, they are not for everyone. Nor are they in many
cases as dissimilar from other more traditional retailers as the press
may have one believe. And because of their strengths, the category
killers will compete with the clubs more fiercely than the
traditionals. And then, after ten or so more years, they will be
thought of as a "traditional" retail delivery format.
Left unexplored by this thesis is the impact of these new
warehouse format retail types is their impact on the smaller Mom
and Pop locally owned retailers in the smaller downtown shopping
areas. Unquestionably the outlook is bleak. These retailers are
chronically undercapitalized and lack the market share to gain the
volume discounts of the larger chains. Their inherent small size
makes them unable to carry the selection of the new big boxes. The
boarding up of downtown Main Street stores across America has
been well-chronicled by the press, and has been blamed first on the
suburban malls and then on the large format discounters like Wal-
Mart and KMart. What these stores have are strong ties to the
community through local ownership. However their ability to react
quickly and accurately to local trends is being equalled if not
bettered by the local management focus and the new distribution
systems of the boxes. The smaller local stores will be the hardest hit
of all by the newest phase of retailing, the warehouse format.
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EXHIBIT I
TYPES OF SHOPPING CENTERS
As Defined by the
Urban Land Institute
1. A neighborhood center provides for the sale of convenience
goods (foods, drugs, and sundries) and personal services (laundry
and dry cleaning, barbering, shoe repairing, etc.) for the day-to-day
living needs of the immediate neighborhood. It is built around a
supermarket as the principal tenant. In theory, the neighborhood
center has a typical gross leasable area (GLA) of 50,000 square feet
(SF). In practise, it may range in size from 30,000 to 100,000 SF.
2. In addition to the convenience goods and personal services
provided by the neighborhood center, a community center
provides a wider range of facilities for the sale of soft lines (wearing
apparel for men, women, and children) and hard lines (hardware and
appliances). The community center offers a greater variety of
merchandise-in sizes, styles, colors and prices. It is built around a
junior department store, variety store, or discount department store
as the major tenant, in addition to a supermarket. It does not have a
full-line department store, though it may have a strong specialty
store or stores. In theory, its typical size is 150,000 SF of GLA, but in
practise, it may range in size from 100,000 to 450,000 SF. The
community center is the intermediate type of center; it is the most
difficult to estimate in terms of size and pulling power.
3. The regional center provides for general merchandise, apparel,
furniture, and home furnishings in depth and variety, as well as a
range of services and recreational facilities. It is built around one or
two full-line department stores of generally not less than 100,000 SF.
In theory, its typical size for definitive purposes is 450,000 SF of
GLA; in practise, it may range from 300,000 to 850,000 SF. The
regional center is the second largest type of shopping center. As
such, it provides services typical of a business district yet not as
extensive as those of the super regional center.
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4. A super regional center provides for extensive variety in general
merchandise, apparel, furniture, and home furnishings, as well as a
variety of services and recreational facilities. It is built around three
or more full-line department stores of generally not less than
100,000 SF each. In theory, the typical size of a super regional
center is about 800,000 SF of GLA. In practise, the size ranges from
from about 600,000 to more than 1,500,000 SF.
NOTE: All centers typically include as site area ( the gross land area
within the property lines) an area of sufficient size to provide for
customer and employee parking in relation to the GLA as determined
by the accepted standard for the parking index.
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EXHIBIT II
Warehouse Clubs
# Existing*
Chicopee
Medford
Marlboro
Nashua, NH
North
Dartmouth
Salem
Weymouth
Saugus
Westboro
# Planned**
Danvers
Framingham
Hyannis
Leominster
Portsmouth
Hingham
Hyannis
North
Attleboro
1. BJ's
2. Sam's
3. Price Club
Natick
Manchester, NH
Avon
Danvers
Nashua, NH
Totals:
*Currently under construction
**Not all of these sites will necessarily be built. Clubs
multiple sites in the same area to gain leverage.
Braintree
Danvers
Dedham
Dorchester
Reading
Seekonk
Worcester
Burlington
Dedham
Waltham
Worcester
Totals:
often negotiate for
Club Name
Seekonk
4. Pace
5. Costco
22
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INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
1. John Riordan, Dianne Kutyla, ICSC, New York, NY 6/4/92
2. William McCullum, Tom Reilly, The O'Connor Company, New York,
NY 6/4/92
3. Cynthia Wraye, JMB Realty, Chicago, IL 6/29/92
4. Barbara Zenker, BJ's Wholesale Company, Framingham, MA.
7/6/92
5. Paul Vogel, Realty Research Development, Chicago, IL. 6/18/92
and 6/29/92
6. Greg Kerfoot, Homart Realty Chicago, IL 6/18/92 and 6/29/92
7. Gary Brown, FW Woolworth & Co., New York, NY 7/6/92
8. Jack McCarthy, CBL, Inc. Boston, MA 6/23/92
9. Robert Anand, Sr., Roache Brothers Supermarkets, Boston, MA
6/25/92
10. Irwin J. Barkin, I.J.Barkin & Co. Boston, MA 6/23/92
11. Steve Samuels, The Samuels Co. Boston, MA 6/23/92
12. Fred Margosian, Margosian, Levy & Co., Watertown, MA 6/24/92
13. John Kelleher, Shaw's Supermarkets, W. Bridgewater, MA
6/26/92
14. Richard Ponte, Stop & Shop Co's, Quincy, MA 6/29/92
15. Richard Rourke, The Flatley Co's, Braintree, MA 6/12/92
16. Patrick F. McCormack, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. New York, NY
7/2/92
17. Sidney Katz, The Grossman Companies, Braintree, MA 7/7/92
18. John Roberts, Home Depot, Waltham, MA 7/8/92
19. Steve Karp, New England Development, Newton, MA 7/7/92
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